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Latin America and the Financial
Crisis of 2008: Lessons and
Challenges
Dr. Luisa Blanco*

ABSTRACT
In October of 2008 there were two main views of what the financial
crisis would do to emerging countries in Latin America. The optimistic
view predicted that they would do well overall and that the crisis would not
have a significant impact on them because their economies were decoupled
from the rest of the world. The pessimistic view saw these economies as
vulnerable to the financial crisis, which meant they would become unstable
and perform poorly. Over a year later, the outcome is something in between.
This article will explain the current state of the financial crisis in Latin
America and the policy responses of various Latin American countries.
Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, will be highlighted because they present very
interesting cases. These examples are important when discussing lessons
and challenges in Latin America. The idea is to focus on what these Latin
American countries have done that has allowed them to perform relatively
well during the crisis, and discuss what challenges policy makers in the
region are facing today and will face in the future.
I. THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON LATIN AMERICA
Four pieces of macroeconomic data illustrate the impact of the financial
crisis in Latin America: levels of gross domestic product (GDP), foreign
trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and remittances. World Bank
projections from September 2009 estimate a 2% GDP decrease on average
for the region for the year of 2009.1 Mexico, however, is a different case; its
GDP is expected to decrease by about 7% in 2009.2 The Latin American
experience during the crisis is quite heterogeneous, because some countries
did not experience contractions (Bolivia, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay), some
experienced miniature contractions (Brazil, Colombia, and the Dominican
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Republic), and others saw large contractions (Mexico). It is very important
economically for Latin America that the financial crisis did not originate
there, as it did in previous financial crises. Compared to other regions, Latin
America was certainly not the hardest hit. Projections estimate that Western
Europe’s GDP will contract by 4.1%, Eastern Europe’s by 5.4%, and Japan’s
by 5.7%.3 The projection for the U.S. is similar to the Latin American
region, around 3%.4
There are three main factors, using current data from the Organisation
for Co-operation and Development (OECD)5, which affect the well being of
Latin America. One is that there was a significant reduction in world trade
in the first quarter of 2009, but in the second quarter world trade started to
stabilize.6 There was a significant decrease in exports from non-OECD
countries in the first quarter of 2009. One should focus on non-OECD
exports, since most Latin American countries are not members of the OECD.
The second quarter however, saw an increase of 1%, indicating some
stabilization7. Some project that the level of exports in Latin American
countries reached bottom, so future growth may be approaching. The level
of non-OECD imports from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter
of 2009 indicates some stabilization, or even future growth. In 2008, exports
in non-OECD countries decreased by about 2% in the third quarter and 4%
in the fourth quarter.8 It is not all bad news. Exports actually increased from
the first quarter to the second in 2009.
Data from the United States is important for Latin America because
Latin American countries export much of their products to the United States.
In 2009, there was a significant reduction in imports from the rest of the
world into the United States, and especially from Latin America. Monthly
averages of United States imports from the world offer a grim picture. From
2008 to 2009, they fell by 28%.9 Imports also fell in 2001 due to that
recession, but only by about 6%. The monthly average of the available
observations for Latin American countries shows a very similar picture.
There was a drop during the recession of 2001 and a drop in the recession of
2008, and the magnitude is greater now than it was then.10 Brazilian imports
to the United States have increased significantly over time, but dropped
precipitously during the current recession. On the upside, they started
stabilizing in July of 2009. Chile shows a similar picture, as does Mexico.
In fact, such drastic drops and the following stabilizations can also be seen
for most of the other countries in the region.11
Data from the Economic Commission of Latin American countries show
trade falling 31% from the first half of 2008 to the first half of 2009.12
Commodity prices decreased by 29% in the same time period, which affects
Latin America’s export market.13 That drop in exports is comparable to the
drop back in the 1930s.14 Projections of volume of trade reduction indicate a
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decrease of 13% in 2009, which is comparable to the time period from 1937
to 1939.15
Another aspect related to the implications of the financial crisis in Latin
America is FDI. FDI plays a key role in Latin America because it provides
capital and technology to countries that otherwise would not have it.
Projections for FDI are not good. FDI is expected to decrease significantly
in 2009, but start to recover slowly in 2010. However, it is expected that
FDI will recover to 2008 levels in 2011.
A recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s
World Investment Report asked international corporations what their
investment plans for 2009 were, and 58% answered that they are expecting
to decrease their investment in all of their countries. 16 Therefore, the
projections are not good. For Latin America a lot of FDI took place before
the financial crisis. Now, however, the effects are starting to show. There
was a drastic drop of 42% from the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter
of 2009.17 Although the drop was drastic, the experience of Latin American
countries with FDI during the crisis has been quite heterogeneous. For some
countries there was an increase in FDI, but for other countries there was a
decrease.
Remittances, money that immigrants send from abroad to their home
regions, are another important indicator.
Remittances have grown
significantly for many years in the region, and Mexico is one of the
countries that receives the most remittances. In 2009, however, there is
expected to be a decline in remittances of about 11%.18 This fall in
remittances will bring them back to the level of remittances in 2006. This
drop in remittances is expected because there is more unemployment in the
United States, where Latin American immigrants have been hit harder and
they are less able to send money back home. The average amount of money
sent back was $241, but is now about $230.19
There is something called the reverse remittances phenomena that has
not been around until now. Immigrants in the United States that used to
support their families back home are now unemployed. Now, they need
their relatives back home to help them. There is some data showing in some
cities in Mexico that the net transfer is negative; more money going out than
coming in, which is a new phenomenon in Latin America.20
II. LATIN AMERICAN RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Latin American countries responded differently to the crisis than other
developed countries did. The first difference is that the crisis did not
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originate in Latin America. They are being affected by something external,
not internal, so they are taking a different approach. Something important to
note is that Latin American countries went through important reforms during
the 1990s, which improved their ability to face a crisis. They are in much
better shape than they were before the reforms.
Just like the United States, many Latin American countries used fiscal
stimulus through greater government spending to address the crisis. Because
of the reforms they implemented in the 1990s, which forced governments to
be more fiscally responsible, many Latin American countries had more room
to maneuver and to implement these fiscal policies. In previous crises, some
Latin American countries did not have the luxury to do that. They actually
had to decrease government spending during a recession.
Another important policy measure was the use of an expansionary
monetary policy. In January of 2009, Mexico decreased its benchmark
interest rate by half a point to 7.75 points.21 That was actually its first cut in
the interest rate since 2006. That is a substantial shift in policy, caused by
the financial crisis. Many other countries in the region had to use an
expansionary monetary policy as well.
Finally, Latin American governments have provided assistance to
financial institutions, but their approach has been different than the approach
taken by the United States because the banking sectors in Latin American
countries did not have the toxic assets that banks in the United States did.
There was, however, some decrease in credit, to which Latin American
governments have responded. The development bank of Brazil started
purchasing shares from banks, and the development bank of Mexico,
Nacional Financiera, started giving credits to small and intermediate
enterprises.22
There are some interesting cases worth noting when discussing lessons
and challenges for the region. Brazil, for instance, is a leader in the region.
It has been affected by the crisis, but is expecting to recover faster than any
other country in the region. One of the reasons Brazil has been very
successful is that it has a very diversified export sector in terms of products
and regions. Another good thing about Brazil is that it has been able to
achieve macroeconomic stability. Brazil faced some trouble during the
1980s and 1990s, but was able to implement some reforms that allow it to
control inflation and be fiscally responsible. In 2000, Brazil passed the
Fiscal Responsibility Law, which forces the government to set a fiscal target
for government expenditures, revenue, and debts, and then stick to it.23
Mexico is a different story. There is a saying that when the U.S.
sneezes, Mexico catches a cold. The current situation is a bit worse than a
cold because the Mexican economy is very dependent on exports to the
United States. Other factors affect Mexico’s economy as well. There are
still major problems with the drug cartels, and in May, the H1N1 flu had a
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negative effect.24 The recession in the United States, however, is definitely
the major reason why Mexico caught not just a cold, but bronchitis.
Mexico is an interesting case because after it faced the Peso Crisis in
1994, Mexico implemented reforms that encourage more fiscal
responsibility, including having a reliable and capable central bank.25 Even
though Mexico is in trouble, it has been able to use fiscal stimulus. It is
surviving the crisis in much better shape than it would have without the
reforms. In one sense, Mexico learned its lesson in the 1990s. Mexico has a
relatively healthy banking system that was not exposed to toxic assets. Also,
it has large reserves of foreign currency, which put it in a much better
position than before.
Chile has also been implementing significant reforms. It has actually
done an excellent job in macro-management. This is because Chile created
stabilization funds.26 During the 2000s there was a significant increase in
the price of copper and Chile received a huge windfall. Instead of wasting
that money, it put it away and saved it. When it needed to implement fiscal
stimulus, it had the stabilization funds to draw from. Chile took the windfall
profits from the state-owned copper company CODELCO, and put it away
and saved it abroad in bonds. Chile is now considering buying foreign stock
with its funds. Chile’s finance minister offered the following financial
philosophy: Chile will spend what is permanent and save what is transitory.
In other words, Chile will spend what it needs to spend, but whatever is
extra, Chile will save because Chile is going to need it later. This policy
seems to be working very well for Chile.
III. LESSONS AND CHALLENGES FOR LATIN AMERICA
A commonality of these countries is that they have implemented
effective policies in a timely manner. This is a plus when looking at the
financial crisis. There are lessons from the Latin American experience that
can be applied to the future. The first one is that Latin American countries
realize that it pays to be fiscally cautious. Latin American countries went
through significant reforms in the 1990s that allowed governments to spend
money more wisely, and provided them with reserves that gave them some
security during the financial crisis. For the region in general, government
debt as a percentage of GDP has decreased significantly.27 They are in a
better position, because now that they need to increase government
spending, they have room to borrow.
Another important fact for Latin American countries is that central
banks and improvements to financial institutions played a key role in
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allowing these countries to be resilient in the financial crisis. In general,
central bank performance across Latin America has been solid; many of the
countries have gone from having inflation rates in the triple digits to
inflation rates in the single digits. Lower inflation gives them more room to
work with monetary policy. They can use expansionary monetary policy
without causing significant inflationary pressures. Also, the improvement of
financial institutions has been important. There has been a significant
increase of credit, as well as financial regulation and supervision. This has
allowed the financial system to remain relatively healthy during the financial
crisis.
The next lesson is very important. Latin American countries after their
reforms of the 1990s were able to build up the credibility of their
institutions. Countries did not panic when the financial crisis hit. Even
when the economic situation was poor, Latin American countries could
pursue stabilization policies. The governments have more control, and the
central banks can monitor inflation carefully.
The last lesson is that countries should not be afraid to ask for
international help. During the financial crisis, many Latin American central
banks worked with the Federal Reserve to insure that they would have
enough foreign currency reserves.28 Cooperation is very important. Until
recently, Latin American countries were very reluctant to get help from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the 1990s, the IMF gave them loans,
but attached stringent conditions. The IMF eventually changed that
approach. It created a flexible credit line in the midst of the financial crisis.
There is no stigma or conditions attached to it. Therefore countries can tap
into it and without worrying about damage to their reputations. Mexico took
advantage of this credit line in May of 2009, which helped it stabilize its
economy.29 Therefore, more Latin American countries should look into
tapping that resource. The World Bank and the Inter-American Bank are
also increasing funds available to deal with the financial crisis.30
There are several challenges that Latin American countries are likely to
face in the future. The first challenge for policy makers in the region is that
Latin America’s fate depends on the recovery of developed countries. Latin
American countries can use fiscal stimulus, but that can only go so far.
Their economies depend significantly on their export sector, primarily the
export of commodities. Global demand needs to pick up so that commodity
prices rise, which will support the export sector in Latin America. Each
country can implement its own policies, but in reality global demand is
going to play a key role in allowing them to recover. If global demand does
not recover quickly, then governments will face some restrictions with their
expansionary fiscal policies because they will have fewer revenues to tap
into it. They will eventually run out of the extra room that they have now.
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Next, policy makers in the region may find it difficult to be fiscally
responsible in the midst of a financial crisis if unemployment continues to
increase. Latin American policy makers should ensure fiscal sustainability
and solvency. If policies in Latin American countries start being perceived
as unsustainable, then there is going to be capital flight and less investment.
This would be a shame because there have been significant improvements in
macroeconomic stability during the 1990s and 2000s.
Another reason that it might be more difficult for Latin American
countries to be fiscally responsible is that many Latin American countries
have very small tax bases. In order to ensure that they remain fiscally
responsible and fiscally solvent, they should implement tax reforms that
improve their tax systems. It has been suggested by some that they create an
independent agency to monitor government spending and the fiscal stimulus
to make sure that solvency is maintained.31 Other Latin American countries
should consider something similar to the Brazilian Fiscal Responsibility Act,
as well as stabilization funds similar to Chile’s.
Finally, it is important for policy makers to keep in mind that they are
dealing with Latin America. While small in comparison to previous crises,
the current crisis is still a crisis. Latin America has a long history of
instability, poverty, and inequality. According to the World Bank, poverty is
around 33%.32 The financial crisis may increase poverty by 15%. That
could create some instability. There is some political instability rising up, so
Latin American countries must make certain to maintain a stable
environment by continuing the process of democratization and strengthening
institutions that promote democracy. They need to be especially careful that
social spending is targeted at the population at risk of falling into poverty.
Latin American countries need to make sure that social spending is targeted
in the right way.
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